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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a relatively new way to conduct commercial exchanges.'
In the span of a little more than five years, the Internet has gone from a
curiosity to a necessary component of any business plan.2 Electronic
commerce (e-commerce) on the Internet has developed so quickly that it has
left the law lagging behind. The result is that courts are increasingly faced
with Internet related problems that are not only beyond their technical
understanding, but also Strain traditional legal doctrines.
One example of this is the application of trademark infringement
doctrine to e-commerce. Trademarks can be used in e-commerce in a variety
of ways. A trademark could be used as part of the domain name of a web
site.' A trademark could also be used on the face of a web page.5 Finally, one
could use a trademark in the metatags6 of a web page.7
One of the issues this Article seeks to address is whether, in any of these
three instances, the holder of a trademark has a claim for contributory
infringement against an Internet Service Provider (ISP) that gives the
infringing party access to the Internet. The second issue this Article
addresses is whether allowing contributory infringement suits against ISPs
is good public policy. Part II of this Article will explain how the Internet
works and the application of trademark infringement law to the use of
trademarks in e-commerce. Part III will discuss contributory infringement.
Finally, Part IV will discuss the public policy implications of allowing suits
for contributory infringement against ISPs.

I. See John R. Warner, TrademarkInfringementOnline:AppropriateFederalReliefFrom
the Illicit Use of TrademarkedMaterialin Web Site Meta Tags, 22 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 133, 137
(2000) ("(Clompanies use online web sites to promote goods and services in formats ranging from
passive or informational advertising to fully interactive points of sale.").
2. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Defining the Limits of Free-Riding in Cyberspace:
Trademark Liabilityfor Metatagging,33 GONz. L. REV. 277, 278 (1997-98).

3. See id. (noting rapid growth of the Internet in recent years).
4. See infra Part II.C.I.

5. See infra Part Il.C.2.
6. Metatags are part of the hidden computer code that make up web pages. For more
discussion of what metatags are and how they are used see infra Part II.A. 1.
7. See infra Part II.C.3.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. How the Internet Works
The Internet is an open network of interconnected computers." Host
computers called servers operate as the links in the Internet network.9 These
links are independent of each other in that a problem in one place on the
network can be routed around by connecting through other servers on the
network. Each server is capable of hosting hundreds of web sites.' ° Each
web site's first page is known as its homepage, and this homepage has a
unique numeric address or URL." There are two ways to access a web site
on the Internet. 2
One way is to enter the web site address, or domain name, into a web
browser such as Netscape Navigator or Microsoft Internet Explorer. These
browsers read a text web address entered by a user such as www.bu.edu as
a numeric address, but browsers allow users to use text terms rather than
numbers to access web sites.'3 The theory being that web users will have an
easier time remembering text terms related to the content of a web site
rather than a long string of numbers." The second way to access a web site
is by using a search engine such as Google" or Hot Bot.16 These search
engines respond to a text query entered by the user such as Boston
University. The search engine 7then creates a list of web sites that most
closely match the search terms.1
Whether a web site is accessed directly or through a search engine the
information the web site contains is transmitted on the network through the
use of a common language called hypertext mark-up language (html). 8 This
8. See Katherine E. Gasparek, Applying the FairUse Defense in Traditional Trademark
Infringement and Dilution Cases to Internet Meta Tagging or Linking Cases, 7 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 787, 789 (1999).

9. See id. at 790.
10. See id.
11. See ld at 790-91. "URL" stands for Uniform Resource Locator.
12. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949,952 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
13. See Gasparek, supra note 8, at 791.
14. As a practical matter, domain names in a text form, rather than the URL number that
each represents, serve the same purpose as trademarks. That is, they make it easier for consumers
to identify goods and services in the market place.
15. See the Google search engine, availableat http://www.google.com/ (last visited July II,
2002).
16. See the Hot Bot search engine, available at http://www.hotbot.com (last visited July II,
2002).
17. For more discussion of how search engines perform this function see infra Part II.A.2.
18. See Gasparek, supra note 8, at 792.
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universal language allows web users to view the graphic and text displays
created by the web page designer. 9 This language is read by the computer
and is not seen by the web user.20 Part of this hidden html code is metatags."
1. What Are Metatags
There are different types of metatags contained in the hidden code of
web pages. 2 The two most common types used by web site designers are
keyword and description metatags.23 For instance, the keyword metatag for
omahasteaks.com 2 lists the terms "steaks, omaha, cooking, gourmet, food,
steak, gifts [and] meat." ' These are terms that clearly describe the content
of the web site. When a web user enters any of those terms, a search engine
that uses metatags to categorize web sites will return a list of web sites that
includes omahasteaks.com.
The metatag description of a web site contains a textual description of
the content of the web site. For instance, the metatag description on the
Omaha Steaks web site reads: "Omaha Steaks offers premium heartland
quality steaks and meats, as well as seafoods, and desserts. Free burgers
when you order from our site."'" A search engine may display this
description along with the web site address in the query list that results from
a web search."
2. How Search Engines Work
A search engine has three parts. First, the search engine software uses
what is known as a spider to actively travel the Web seeking out new web
sites and reporting its results back to the search engine database. ' The
database contains information on all the web sites the search engine has
cataloged.29 Second, the database catalogs web sites according to the
software program of the search engine. Some search engines give little or no
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.

22. To view the metatags of a given web site using either a Netscape or Internet Explorer
browser, click on the "view" tab and then click on "source" or "page source" in the pull-down
menu.

23. See O'Rourke, supra note 2, at 281.
24. See Omaha Steaks web site, available at http://www.omahasteaks.com (last visited July
11,2002).
25. See id
26. Id.
27. See O'Rourke, supra note 2, at 282.
28. See id. at 283. One might argue that this information gathering activity is a trespass to
chattel. The counter argument is implied license. The argument on this issue then, would seem
to center on how much data the implied license covers.
29. See id.
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weight to metatags, while others will rank a web page higher on a query list
when a keyword appears more than once in the metatag. However, not all
search engines use metatags to categorize the Web. 3 Many search engines
rely on scans of the individual pages of a web site for key words as well as
the domain names of those web sites in order to categorize a given web
site." No matter where a trademark might be used on a web site it is likely
to be picked up by a search engine spider and become part of the
categorization of that web page."
The third part of the search engine is the search function that responds
to the keyword queries of users. 4 This software searches the database and
returns a list of the web sites it has cataloged that most closely respond to
the user query.35
The limitations of this system are two-fold.36 First, this system of
locating a discrete web site is limited by the search engine database.37
Obviously, the larger the database the more likely it is to contain the web
site that the user is seeking. Second, this system is limited by the accuracy
of the user's keyword input.38 Anyone who has used search engines before
knows that the use of general terms can result in a query list that is literally
thousands of entries long.39 The savvy web user knows that even a very
specific inquiry can result in a number of responses that are irrelevant to
what the web user is seeking.40
If, for instance, one were looking for the Omaha Steaks web site and
entered the search terms Omaha Steaks the resulting query list would
contain 27,200 responses.4' The first site on the list is the Omaha Steaks

30. See id. at 285.
31. See id. at 286; see also Warner, supra note 1, at 139 (noting that Alta Vista, Hot Bot,
and Infoseek search engines use metatags, while Excite and Lycos do not).
32. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045
(9th Cir. 1999).
33. See O'Rourke, supra note 2, at 282 (noting that most search engines cannot scan for
words that are part of a graphic display). Id. Therefore, if a trademark were used in a graphic
display, it would not affect search engines. Searches conducted using search engines could not be
manipulated. But see id. at 305.
34. See id. at 283.
35. See id.

36. See id. at 283-85.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See id.
See id. at 283-84.
See id.
See id. at 285-86.
Search conducted using Google, available at http://www.google.com (last visited July

11,2002).

UNIVER1TY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW& POLICY

(Vol. 7

web site, and most of those in the top ten are related to the sale of Omaha
Steaks.42 However, a search for the term steak returns nearly 900,000 web
sites, and the Omaha Steaks web site is eighteenth on the list.43
Most users will not venture beyond the first ten or twenty responses to
a search." Web site designers are keenly aware of this, and therefore they
have a strong incentive to get their web site listed in the top ten of a
keyword query.45 Furthermore, this simple example shows that the use of
trademarks on the Web can help to narrow the scope of search results.
Those who use trademarks on their web sites increase the likelihood that
people searching for a specific product will be able to locate their web site
on the Web.*
3. Why Web Page Designers Manipulate Search Engines
Web sites are created for commercial purposes and must be visited by
customers to be effective. Designers are aware that most Internet users

locate web pages through the use of search engines.47 This gives
unscrupulous web designers an incentive to manipulate search engines by
including irrelevant terms in their web pages. In this way web designers
hope to increase traffic on their web site in order to increase the sales of
products and services.
A second reason for manipulating search engines is that many web sites
sell advertising. As with television advertising, the rates charged on the Web
are tied to the number of viewers. 4 On the Internet the number of viewers
of a web site is measured in "hits."'49 A hit is an individual visit to a web
site. ° Thus, even if the web user only visits a web site for a moment the web
site records a hit. Increased hits to a web site result in increased advertising
revenues for the web site.

42. See id.

43. See id
44. See O'Rourke, supra note 2, at 284.45. See id.

46. There are many classes of products that are commonly identified by a trademark such
as Kleenex, Coke, or Clorox. Sometimes these terms are appropriated by the public to identify an
entire class of products. This is known as "genericide." See Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior
Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 100, 101 (2d Cir. 1989) (Murphy bed); Bayer Co. v. United Drug
Co., 272 F. 505, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (aspirin). When genericide occurs the previously
trademarked term is no longer protectable and can be used by others with impunity. See Murphy
Door Bed, 874 F.2d at 100. But so long as a term maintains its trademark status, the unauthorized
use of it may be infringing. See id

47. See O'Rourke, supra note 2, at 282.
48. See id. at 284.
49. See id.
50. See id.
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Given these monetary incentives it should come as no surprise that some
web sites will resort to the unauthorized use of trademarked terms in their
web pages in order to attract web users to their web site."t To understand
why manipulating search engines in this way is infringing behavior it is
important to understand the basics of trademark law.
B. TrademarkLaw
A trademark is defined as: "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof' that a person uses in commerce to identify goods.I
Trademark law is really just a part ofthe broader law of unfair competition. 3
As a portion of unfair competition law, trademark law seeks to encourage
the proper conduct of businesses in the economic market place.
The theory behind allowing protection for trademarks is that it allows
consumers to more easily identify the products they seek.' Consequently,
it also is thought to prevent the palming-off of goods of inferior or different
quality as those of the trademark holder." Trademark creates a property right
in the holder of the mark.' The holder has an incentive to invest in the mark
by advertising as well as simply by creating a quality product that people
will wish to purchase again and again. 7
By granting some limited protection for trademarks, the holders of
trademark rights are encouraged to build goodwill in the minds of
consumers; and consumer search costs are reduced because goods are more
easily identifiable." The trade off, however, is that the holder has some right
to exclude the use of his mark by others which can be anti-competitive. 9
1. Levels of Trademark Protection
Trademark law allows for varying levels of protection depending on the
strength of the mark. ° This is important because the trademark holder's
ability to exclude others from using his trademark is directly linked to the
51. See discussion infraPart II.C.3.
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127(1994).
53. See Gasparek, supra note,8, at 795.
54. See Rachel Jane Posner, ManipulativeMetatagging,Search Engine Baiting,and Initial
Interest Confusion, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 439, 447-48 (2000) (identifying three basic
values of trademark law as protecting the public from deception, protecting trademark holders

from having their good will misappropriated, and encouraging competition).
55. See id.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See id. at 448.
See id.
See id.
See Gasparek, supra note 8, at 795-96.
See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)

(discussing the varying levels of trademark protection).
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strength of the mark. That is, a strong mark will get more protection than a
weak mark. There are four categories of trademarks. A trademark can be
generic,6 ' descriptive,62 suggestive, 3 or arbitrary or fanciful."
2. Trademark Infringement
The primary way a trademark holder enforces his rights is by bringing
suit against alleged infringers. The Lanham Act of 1946 created the federal

statutes governing trademark infringement." Under the Lanham Act one
infringes a trademark when, without consent, they use another's mark in
61. A generic trademark has the lowest level of protection. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL.,
581 (2d ed. 2000) (citing Bayer Co.
v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)). In fact, a generic mark is basically
unprotectable. See id. A generic mark simply describes the basic nature of a class of products
rather than any individualized characteristics of a particular product. See idTerms such as aspirin
or cellophane have been held generic. See id.
62. A descriptive trademark "identifies a characteristic or quality of an article or service."
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE

Vision Ctr. v.Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d I II, 115 (5th Cir. 1980). A descriptive term is generally not
protectable under trademark law, see 15 U.S.C. § i 052(e)(1) (West Supp. IV 1998), unless it has
§ 1052(f). Secondary meaning is acquired when, in the minds
acquired secondary meaning. See id.
of consumers, a mark is associated with a single producer. See Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co.,
305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (To establish secondary meaning, a manufacturer must show that, in the
minds of the public the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source
of the product rather than the product itself.). For example, the term "Vision Center," with
reference to an optical products and services business has been held a descriptive mark. See Vision
Or., 596 F.2d at 117. The distinction between generic and descriptive marks is important because
while the generic mark can never get trademark protection, adescriptive mark may be protectable
if secondary meaning can be established. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 61, at 581.
63. The suggestive mark is a slight change in degree from the descriptive mark. See MERGES
ETAL., supra note 61, at 581. As with a descriptive mark, the suggestive mark distinguishes itself
by describing some particular aspect of the product. See id. However, in the case of the descriptive
mark, the connection between the mark and the product is obvious; whereas in the case of the
suggestive mark, some level of imagination on the part of the consumer is required to make the
connection between the mark and the product producer. See id. For example, the term
"Coppertone" has been held suggestive with respect to tanning products. See Douglas Labs., Inc.
v. Copper Tan, Inc., 210 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1954). To make the connection between the term
"Coppertone" and tanning products requires some imagination while connecting "Vision Center"
with an optical products and services business does not. See id. Another key distinction between
the descriptive mark and the suggestive mark is that the suggestive mark is protectable without
proof of secondary meaning. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 61, at 58 1.
64. The arbitrary or fanciful mark is completely unrelated to the product the mark
represents. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 61, at 581. For example, the mark "Kodak" is
classified as fanciful because the term has no connection to the camera and photographic
equipment it represents. See Kodak Co. v. Weil, 234 N.Y.S. 319 (1930). That is, when one hears
the word Kodak it does not conjure up any particular product. See id. Rather, Kodak, because of
extensive advertising and product sales, has come to represent camera equipment and film. See
id.
65. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994)).
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commerce in a way that is likely to cause confusion to consumers." The key
statutory elements of infringement are: use in commerce and likelihood of
confusion. Use in commerce generally requires the sale, or at least the
shipment, of goods having the trademark on them.67
When a court seeks to determine whether there is a likelihood of
consumer confusion they rely on a balancing test that includes a number of
factors. 68 These factors are: (1) strength of the mark;69 (2) proximity of the
goods;70 (3) similarity of the marks;7 (4) evidence of actual confusion;72 (5)
marketing channels used;" (6) type of goods and the degree of care likely
to be exercised by the purchaser;7 4 (7) defendant's intent in selecting the

66. See Posner, supra note 54, at 449.
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127(1994).

The term "use in commerce" means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary
course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes
of this Act, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce

-

(1) on goods

when - (A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the
displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the
nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents
associated with the goods or their sale, and (B) the goods are sold or transported
in commerce, and (2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or
advertising of services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services
are rendered in more than one State or in the United States and a foreign country
and the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with

the services.
Id
68. See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979). The factors
courts consider in the likelihood of confusion analysis vary in each circuit but are generally
consistent with those articulated in Sleekcraft. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc.,
233 F.3d 456, 461-62 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying a seven factor test to assess likelihood of
confusion).
69. See Sleekcrafi, 599 F.2d at 349-50 (discussing categories of trademark protection). See
also infra Part ll.B.I.
70. See Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 350 (finding that the more related the goods sold under the
respective marks the more likely that confusion may result).
71. See id. at 350-52 (discussing the similarity of the marks themselves - the more
similarity, the more likely consumers will be confused).
72. See id.at 352-53 (discussing the use of objective evidence of consumer confusion).
73. See id.. at 353 (finding that when goods are marketed to same consumer markets the
likelihood of confusion increases).
74. See id. at 353-54 (theorizing that consumers will take more care in purchasing more
expensive goods, and therefore cheaper goods carry with them a greater chance that consumers
could be confused).
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mark;" (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines. 6 This is a nonexhaustive list of factors that courts may consider." Because this is a
balancing test no particular weight is assigned to any given factor.78
These are the basic elements of the infringement analysis. Courts have
identified a number of legal theories regarding when consumers may be
confused.' 9 For purposes of this Article only two of these theories are
relevant. The first is the traditional theory of direct infringement discussed
above. The ideal example of this type of infringement occurs where similar
products bearing confusingly similar trademarks are sold side-by-side. The
second theory courts have relied upon in the Internet context is initial
interest confusion."0 Here, the consumers confusion as to source of goods
occurs before they see the products side-by-side on a shelf.8 Rather they are
lured, if you will, into a store on the promise of certain goods being present
there only to find the goods of a different producer.8 2
When a trademark is used in a domain name or.on the face of a web page
it is easy to see both used "how the mark has been" in commerce and the
potential for "likelihood of confusion." 3 When a trademark is used in a
metatag there is some debate on the issue of consumers confusion." This is
primarily because web users never see a trademark contained in a metatag s5
Some commentators claim that it is the search engine that is in fact being
confused rather than the consumer. 6 Other commentators make the more
practical observation that consumers are well aware that search engine
results contain a number of listings that are irrelevant to their intended

75. See S1eekcraf, 599 F.2d at 354 (finding that ifdefendant intended to confuse consumers
then it is presumed the defendant can accomplish his purpose).
76. See id. (finding that where there is a "strong possibility" that different product
manufacturers will eventually expand into the same markets, the likelihood of consumer confusion
increases).
77. Seeid at 348 n.l.
78. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054
(9th Cir. 1999).
79. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 61, at 689-91 (discussing various types of confusion
courts have recognized in infringement suits).
80. See Broolield, 174 F.3d at 1057.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. In these instances, the way a trademark is used is closely analogous to the way one might
see it used in a brick and mortar store. Either the mark in the form of a logo or as text is seen by
the buyer, and the buyer will attach that mark to the goods of a particular supplier. Thus, the same
type of analysis that would apply when products are on a store shelf will apply with equal force
to the use of trademarks in a domain name or on the face of a web page.
84. See O'Rourke, supra note 2, at 294.
85. See id.at 281.
86. See Posner, supra note 54, at 493.
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search." The distinction between trademarks in metatags and in domain
names, or on the face of web pages, will become important when assessing
the public policy of allowing for contributory infringement suits in each
context.
3. Fair Use
A trademark is a property right that allows the holder some measure of
exclusive use of the mark.8' The fair use defense is a limitation on this
property right. 9 It allows others to use a protected mark for certain limited
purposes. 9° Under the Lanham Act, a defendant claiming fair use must prove
three elements. 9 First, a defendant must prove that their use of the mark was
not as a trademark.92 Second, the defendant must prove they used the
trademark in "good faith."93 And finally, they must establish that their use
of the
was example
descriptive only."
Themark
simplest
of fair use is comparative advertising. Here a seller
makes reference to a competitor's product in order to make a comparison
between the'two. Because it is often impossible to refer to a competitor's
product without using the trademark, the fair use defense insures that the
holder of a mark does not have complete monopoly use of a given trademark
term. The existence of a fair use defense to trademark infringement is
important in the context of contributory infringement suits because at some
stage in the process, leading up to and including litigation, someone must
consider the availability of the defense. The public policy issue that will be
discussed later is: Who should bear the burden of determining whether fair
use is a viable claim in a given case? In connection with that question, one
must consider the affect on commerce of placing that burden with either the
trademark holder or the alleged contributory infringer."
C. TrademarkInfringement on the Internet

There are three different ways a trademark could be infringed on the
Internet. The following discussion is intended to point out the legal theories
relied on by courts in each of these three instances. Arguably the most clear
87. See O'Rourke, supra note 2, at 294.
88. See infra Parts II.B.1, ll.B.2.
89. See Gasparek, supra note 8, at 797.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 798.
92. See id. (that the use of the trademark was not to identify a product in commerce in order
to imply some association with the trademark).
93. See id. (that the user of another's trademark did so without the intent to confuse

consumers).
94. See id.
95. See id.
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cut example of trademark infringement is where similar goods are sold sideby-side with similar trademarks used to identify them. Here, the potential for
consumer confusion is most obvious and its affect is most direct on the
producers of the respective goods, as the sale of one ofthe goods necessarily
means the loss of a sale for the other producer. Some courts have resorted
to the theory of initial interest confusion to find infringement in instances
where, at least at the time of purchase, the consumer is not confused about
the source of the product they are purchasing."
This theory falls a little left of center in terms of common law
understanding of what trademark (or unfair competition law) was intended
to protect. This is important because the subject of this Article is third party
liability. As will be explained, third party liability requires that there is an
initial infringer.97 If the initial infringement is attenuated at best, then the
argument, at least from the public policy standpoint, against holding a third
party liable is strengthened."
1. Domain Names
A domain name is the text version of a web site address." The domain
name appears at the top of the page in most browser programs and is readily
seen by the user."° If a web user does not know the domain name of the web
site they wish to visit they may choose to use a search engine. Many times
however a web user will simply assume that the web page of a company is
the name of the company followed by ".com."'' A domain name serves
much the same function as a sign on a storefront - it identifies goods and
services in commerce.
In Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Video,'

the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals applied a direct infringement analysis to a case involving
domain names."0 3 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had registered a
domain name that infringed one of the plaintiff's trademarks."°4 On the basis
of its analysis the circuit court granted a preliminary injunction against the
defendant's use of the allegedly infringing domain name.' 0° By way of
analogy to the world of brick and mortar storefronts, this case involved two
96. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044
(9th Cir. 1999).
97. See infra Part III.A.
98. See id
99. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1044.
100. See id.
10. See idat 1045.
102. See id. at 1044.
103. See id. at 1045.
104. See Broofield, 174 F.3d at 1041. The circuit court applied the Sleekcrafl factors noted
infra at Part II.B.2.
105. See Broo~field 174 F.3d at 1061.
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stores using the same sign on their storefront. Given the close connection
between a domain name and a storefront sign the analysis in this case is not
surprising. It is clear that, barring the assertion of a valid defense, the
unauthorized use of a trademark in a domain name is infringing.
2. On the Face of a Web Page
The use of a trademark on the face of a web page could be analogized to
using another's trademark in an advertisement or on a billboard.' °6 As one
might expect, courts have applied a direct infringement analysis to these
types of cases as well.' 7 In Goto.com v. Walt Disney Co. 08 the circuit court
found that the defendant was guilty of infringing the plaintiff's trademark by
using it on the face of its web page.'" This involved the application of a
direct trademark infringement analysis. "0 Trans Union v. CreditResearch"'
involved the defendant's unauthorized use of the plaintiff's trademark on
their web site." 2 Here again, the district court applied a direct infringement
analysis. 13
These cases both involved the use of logos on the face of web pages.
This is easily analogized to using a logo in an advertisement, meaning that
application of contributory liability in these instances could be analogized
to/with traditional cases of trademark infringement. There is a strong link
between common law torts, like unfair competition, and statutory trademark
infringement." 4 As will be discussed later, the genesis of contributory
liability in trademarks is in the common law."' Therefore, when the alleged
trademark infringement can be easily analogized to common law forms of
unfair competition, it is easy to take the next step and find contributory
liability.
However, the use of another's trademark on the face of a web page will
not always result in a finding of infringement. The fair use doctrine allows
one to use a trademark for descriptive purposes and not be considered an
infringer. In Playboy v. Welles,"16 the district court found that the

106.
107.
108.
109.

See id. at 1064.
See id. at 1060.
202 F.3d 1199, 1211 (9th Cir. 2000).
See id.

110. See id. at 1205-09 (applying the Sleekcrafl eight-factor test).
111. 142 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (N.D. Il1.2001).
112. See id.

113. See id at 1022-32 (applying the seven-factor test from Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural
Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 461-62 (7th Cir. 2000)).
114. See Posner, supra note 54, at 447.
115. See infra Part 1l1.D.
116. 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1090 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
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defendant's use of the "playboy" and "playmate of the year" trademarks on
the face of her web page were fair uses." '7 The defendant was a former
playmate of the year and thus the district court found her use of the term was
descriptive and a fair use."'
Cases such as Welles establish that the mere existence of another party's
trademark on a web page is not necessarily infringing. This should create
some concern when we begin to consider third party liability. Is it
reasonable to think that ISPs will understand the fair use doctrine and are
they willing to take the chance that they could be wrong? Is it perhaps more
reasonable to think that the risk averse ISP will demand removal of any
trademark that does not belong to the web site owner in order to avoid
potential litigation?
3. Metatags
Trademark infringement in the metatag context is not as easily
analogized to traditional forms of trademark infringement. This is primarily
because metatags are not seen by Internet users. Trademark is primarily
concerned with consumer confusion, and when the trademark is unseen by
the Internet user the link between the use of the trademark and consumer
confusion is attenuated." 9 Because of this, courts have resorted to a
particularized theory of infringement called initial interest confusion. 20
In Brookfield,the circuit court used a hypothetical situation to illustrate
the concept of initial interest confusion.21 The hypothetical involved
Blockbuster Video putting up a billboard on the highway that said "West
Coast Video" next exit. 122 When the consumer arrives at the next exit they
find only a Blockbuster video store. If they choose to go to Blockbuster they
will do so knowing that they are patronizing Blockbuster. However, the
concern is that they took the exit off the highway because they wanted to
patronize West Coast Video. In Brookfield, the circuit court found that the
metatags from its web site
defendant's use of the plaintiff's trademark in the
2
was trademark infringement under this theory.1

117. See id.
I18. See Id. at 1071.
119. See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,

1044 (9th Cir. 1999).
120. See id.

121. See id.
122. Playboy, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
123. See id. at 1066.
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4. Questionable Nature of the Initial Interest Confusion Theory
Application of initial interest confusion theory of infringement in the
metatag context has been accepted in only a few circuits.2 4 The theory has
been questioned by a number of commentators. " It depends heavily on two
26
factors. First, that search engines are in fact manipulated by metatags.'
Second, that consumers are confused by the appearance of multiple,
sometimes irrelevant responses, when they do a keyword search with a
search engine. Both of these premises are questionable.
The theory that search engines generally can be manipulated by metatags
is debatable. The implication of the Brookfield court is that metatags will
influence all search engines.'27 This is not true. Many search engines in fact
do not scan metatags at all.' 28 Many others give them a low priority in terms
of categorizing web sites. 29 Furthermore, the circuit court admits that when
a person conducts a search, the resulting list contains the domain names of
the various sites. 30 Thus, the consumer has the opportunity to see both the
Blockbuster sign and the West Coast Video sign side-by-side before
deciding which store to visit. 3
This fact leads to the conclusion that consumers are not necessarily
confused. Most search engine users are well aware of the fact that any given
keyword search is going to result in a number of listings that are
irrelevant. 3 2 A better case for initial interest confusion could be made if, as
a result of a keyword search, the Internet user was connected directly to a
web site rather than being given a list of web sites from which to choose. It
is difficult to see the difference between a search result list on the Internet
and a person sitting in the parking lot of a strip mall. In both situations the
124. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 464 (7th Cir. 2000); Bihari
v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (an example of a district court case from the
Second Circuit); PACCAR, Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 115 F. Supp. 2d 772,775 (E.D. Mich.
2000) (an example of a district court case from the Sixth Circuit); Broolfield, 174 F.3d at 1044

(an example of a case from the Ninth Circuit).
125. See Dan McCuaig, Halve The Baby: An Obvious Solution To The Troubling Use Of
TrademarksAs Metatags, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 643, 654, 658-64 (2000)
(arguing that Brookfield was wrongly decided); Michael R. Sees, Use ofAnother's Trademarkin
a Web Page Meta Tag: Why LiabilityShould Not Ensure Under the Lanham Act For Trademark
Infringement, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 99, 113 (1998) (arguing, pre-Brookfield, that Lanham

Act did not cover direct infringement when trademark is used in metatag).
126. See Warner, supra note 1, at 139 (noting that several popular Internet search engines
use metatags for searching, including Alta Vista, Hot Bot, and Infoseek).
127. See Broolfield, 174 F.3d at 1062.

128. See O'Rourke, supra note 2, at 286 (stating that the "Excite" search engine does not
look at metatags and others give them little weight).
129. See id.
130. See Brookfield 174 F.3d at 1062.

131. See id.
132. See O'Rourke, supra note 2, at 294.
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consumer is faced with a number of options and must take some affirmative
step to choose one of them. In both cases the consumer knows full well
what store, or web site, they are entering. It is debatable whether the initial
interest confusion theory is applicable to search engine manipulation.'33
With respect to trademark infringement in domain names or on the face
of a web page the analogy to direct trademark infringement is strong. There
can be little doubt that the statutory prerequisites of use in commerce and
consumer confusion can readily be shown. 4 The consumer confusion in
these cases is direct. The Internet user views the domain name or the web
page with the infringing trademark, leading to confusion as to the source of
the goods or services the domain name or web page represents. 3 ' The initial
interest confusion theory relies on a middleman - the search engine - to
induce the confusion. 3 6 Because consumers are well aware that search
engines do not always produce relevant results the validity of the initial
interest confusion theory in the metatag context is debatable.'37
If we proceed on the assumption that the reasonable consumer can be
confused by search engine results then the debatable nature of the initial
interest confusion theory is less troublesome. This is because search engines
take into account not just metatags, but also the text on the face of web
pages and domain names when they produce result lists in response to
keyword queries.' 38 A trademark on the face of a web page is just as capable
of manipulating a search engine as a trademark used in a metatag.'39
This leads to the conclusion that what the Brookfield court was really
after was stopping search engine manipulation, not the theoretical
40
infringement that takes place when a trademark is used in a metatag.1
133. Many of the cases involving infringement with respect to metatags have also involved
other forms of infringement such as domain names or use of the trademark on the face of a web
page. However, at least one case has found infringement solely on the basis of metatags. See

generally Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998)
(finding trademark infringement where the defendant copied every word in plaintiff's metatags
to his own web site).
134. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
135. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062-64.

136. See id.
137. See McCuaig, supra note 125, at 658-64; Sees, supra note 125, at 113.
138. See infra Part II.A.2; Warner, supra note I, at 140 (noting that software publishers
advise web designers not to put important information in a graphical form because search engine
scans of the web page will not pick them up).
139. The use of atrademark on the face of aweb page may in fact manipulate search engines
more than those in metatags given that some search engines do not even consider metatags when
producing search results. See O'Rourke, supra note 2, at 285.
140. Clearly the use of a trademark on the face of a web page creates a cause of action for
trademark infringement. See infra Part II.C.2 and accompanying notes. Use of a trademark in a
metatag has the same effect on search engines, but pre-Brookfield would not necessarily create
a cause of action for trademark infringement.
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Manipulating search engines looks like unfair competition. The public
policy question of whether the law should prevent this kind of activity can
be debated.""' However, there is a threshold question of whether this
manipulation actually leads to consumer confusion.
There is no doubt that some people may be confused as a result of search
engine manipulation. But the standard for liability for trademark
infringement considers the reasonable consumer.'42 If the hypothetical
reasonable person is not confused by search engine manipulation there is no
reason to allow a suit for infringement.'43 Consequently, there would be no
reason to allow third party suits.'44 The linchpin that allows the initial
interest confusion theory to operate in the Internet context, and would allow
extension of that theory to third parties, is the finding that consumers are
actually confused by search engines.
The reason not to extend such liability to third parties is simple - the
theory is too attenuated. 4 ' The alternative theory is that, with respect to
contributory infringement, it makes no difference whether initial interest
confusion is a good theory. As a practical matter, the use of a trademark
anywhere on a web site has the potential to manipulate search engines, and
therefore, in theory, confuse consumers.'" If most web sites are located on
141. See Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167 (C.D. Cal.
1998); Posner, supra note 54, at 475-76 (discussing Bally case). In Bally, the defendant used the
Bally's trademark on a web page dedicated to complaints about the company's health clubs. See
Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 162. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgement on the theory that there was no likelihood of confusion between the defendant's web
site and the plaintiff's. See id. at 1166. While it is clear that the defendant was using the Bally's
trademark to manipulate search engines, and thus get his message to the public, such manipulation
is not actionable because it did not meet the trademark infringement standard of likelihood of
confusion. Id. at 1167. As a practical matter, it is doubtful that a person searching for Bally's on
the Web is likely to be looking for a "Bally's complaints" web site. Id.Nonetheless, the defendant
was allowed to manipulate search engines as a form of fair use. See Posner, supra note 54, at 476.
142. See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 353 (9th Cir. 1979) ("ln assessing the
likelihood of confusion to the public, the standard used by the courts is the typical buyer
exercising ordinary caution.").
143. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064
(9th Cir. 1999).
144. Although there are no cases finding third party liability on the basis of metatags, that
cause of action appears to exist according to the case law.
145. Since contributory infringement is based on the common law, one would argue that the
initial infringement that triggers contributory liability must also be based on the common law.
There is no indication that there was ever an initial interest confusion theory of liability at
common law. This is an argument from history. Historically, the common law permitted third
party liability but did not recognize initial interest confusion. However, the initial interest
confusion theory is not statutory either. Thus both initial interest confusion and contributory
liability have their origins in the common law, and as such, there is no reason they cannot be
combined given that the common law is expected to grow and develop with time.
146. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064.
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the Web through the use of search engines, then third party liability should
not depend on how the search engine is manipulated, only that it is and that
this is the intent of the web designer.
As a general matter, in the likelihood of confusion analysis the intent of
the defendant to confuse is often times enough to find infringement
irrespective of the other seven factors articulated in Sleekcraft. 7 One might
argue that Brookfield was simply an outcome determinative decision. The
circuit court, having found intent or bad faith on the part of the alleged
infringer, set out to find a theory that would allow them to hold against that
party.
If Internet users are in fact confused by search engine results, then
whether the trademark was used on the face of the web page or in the
metatags should make no difference. 48 The result is still the same. The
better argument would seem to be, that absent compelling evidence, that a
reasonable consumer would be confused by search engine manipulation, the
initial interest confusion theory should not apply.
III. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY
A. General Theory
Contributory infringement has its origin in the common law tort cause
of action for vicarious liability. " ' The theory is that a third party can be held
liable for the tortious conduct of another if that third party purposefully
assists the first party in the infringement despite having no direct control
over that party. 50 Contributory liability is distinguished from vicarious
liability because the later requires the third party to exert some control over
147. See id. at 1059 (finding courts willing to infer confusion where defendant adopted the
mark with intent of deceiving the public).
148. Domain names are not included here because they are listed in search engine search
results. Therefore, one who visits a web site with a trademark in the domain name is not
necessarily relying on the fact that the web page turned up on a list in response to a search engine
query.
149. See John T. Cross, Contributory Infringement and Related Theories of Secondary
Liabilityfor Trademark Infringement, 80 IOWA L. REv. 101 (1994). The author distinguishes two
forms of contributory infringement. See id. at 106. In the first subcategory are cases in which the
distributor sells the product without a trademark label to the party that is guilty of direct
infringement- that is bulk sales of unlabeled products. See id The second sub-category are cases
he refers to as "indirect infringement" in which a labeled product is sold by the distributor. See
id. at 107. Cross notes that most courts do not distinguish between the two "because they are
reluctant to allow a defendant who actually used the plaintiffs mark to escape liability merely
because it interposed a distributor or retailer between it and the ultimate consumer." See id. at
108.
150. See id.
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the direct infringer."' For third party liability of any kind to exist, there must
be a direct infringer." 2 That is, one could not hold the employer liable
without first proving that his employee was responsible for some tortious
act.
In the realm of intellectual property, there is a statutory cause of action
for contributory infringement in patent law.' While in copyright the cause
of action maintains its common law roots, Congress has created statutory
provisions outlining when a cause of action may be brought against an
ISP."4 However, there is no statutory cause of action in the Lanham Act for
contributory infringement of trademarks."' Because trademark law has
common law origins, one might sue for contributory infringement on the
tort law theory of vicarious liability." 6 Some discussion of the scope of
contributory infringement in patent and copyright law may help inform the
debate about its proper scope in trademark.
B. Patent Origins of Contributory Infringement Theory
Patent infringement is governed by statutory law." 7 Under the statute,
"[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall bd a patent
infringer.""' A contributory infringer is one who "offers to sell or sells...
or imports.., a component of a patented [product] ... knowing the same
to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement.""' 9
The standard for contributory infringement is "knowing," i.e. actual
knowledge. 60 As will be discussed later, this is a stronger knowledge
requirement then has been demanded in the trademark context. 6' In
addition, the patent doctrine is limited to products.' 62 As will be discussed,
in the trademark context, the doctrine of contributory infringement began
with products but has since been extended to include services.'63

151. See id.
152. See id.at 103.
153. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)(1994).
154. See infra Part IV.C.
155. See Cross, supra note 149, at 109-10 (noting that lack of express language does not
mean the cause of action does not "arise under" the Lanham Act as the Act evolved from the
common law).
156. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1994).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.§ 271(c).
160. See id.
161. See infra Part II1.D.1.
162. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1994).
163. See infra Part 1I.D.1.
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C. ContributoryInfringement in Copyright
Contributory infringement in the copyright context is controlled by the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),'" at least for the purposes of
this Article in considering ISP liability. Prior to the passage of the DMCA,
courts had found third parties liable for contributory infringement in the
copyright context. 65 In fact, the leading case in this area seems to have
prompted congressional action.'"
In Religious Technology Centerv. Netcom, 161 the district court addressed
the issue of whether "a computer bulletin board service (BBS), and the large
Internet access provider that allows that BBS to reach the Internet, should
be liable for the copyright infringement committed by a subscriber of the
BBS.' 68 The district court admitted there was no statutory authority for
third party liability in the copyright context.' 69 Rather, it contended that
vicarious liability is found "in virtually all areas of the law."' 70 Finding
"contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of
identifying the circumstance in which it is just to hold one individual
accountable for the actions of another."' 71
The ule the district court offered is that liability for contributory
infringement is established when the defendant "with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces, cause materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another'" In Netcom, the plaintiff notified Netcom of the
alleged infringement." 3 For the district court, this letter was possibly
enough to give Netcom the requisite knowledge.' 74 Netcom argued that the
164. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 105 Pub. L. No. 304-105, 112 Stat. 2877
(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000)).
165. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
166. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998) (referring to
Religious Technology Center among other cases).
167. 907 F. Supp. at 1361.
168. Id. at 1365. This case involved a former minister of the Church of Scientology, Erlich,

who had become a critic of the church. See id. The defendant posted portions of copyrighted
material to a BBS operated by one of the defendants. See id. at 1365-66. The district court
addressed only the defendant's motion for summary judgment in this case. See id at 1365.

169. See id. at 1373.
170. Id. (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984)).
171. Id.
172. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1373 (quoting Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia
Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
173. See id. at 1366. The plaintiff initially tried to convince Erlich, the former minister, to
stop posting the infringing material. See id Failing that, the plaintiff contacted the defendants who
refused to remove the material, unless the plaintiff proved they owned the copyrights. See id.
174. See id at 1374. The district court says it is an issue of fact whether Netcom had the
opportunity to stop the distribution of the infringing message. See id.That is, even if the letter was
enough to impute knowledge to Netcom, if the message was no longer on the BBS, there would
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alleged infringement must be unequivocal before they can be considered to
have knowledge.'" The district court found this too strict a standard, but
offered that a defendant's claim of lack of knowledge might be found
reasonable in certain
instances, even though copyright infringement had
1 76
actually occurred.
On the issue of whether the defendant had 'induced, caused or materially
contributed' to the infringement, the district court found that Netcom did
not completely relinquish control of their network when they granted access
to a customer.' 77 The district court stated that it is fair to assume Netcom
could have taken simple measures to prevent further distribution of the
plaintiff's copyrighted works. 7 The implication of the focus on the control
element is that an ISP is responsible for the content of anything on a web
site it hosts. 79 While in this case the infringing material was on a bulletin
board and arguably easy to remove, this rationale would not extend to a web
site where potentially the only way to excise the infringing material would
be to close down the entire web site.8 0
Limited to these facts, the implications of the Netcom decision could be
devastating to web-based publishing. If any person publishes material on the
Web containing a copyright notice, that individual's ISP could be liable for
contributory infringement, if the holder of that copyright provides some
form of notice to the ISP. In this case, a letter appears to be enough, but the
district court does not spell out the notice requirements.'' It is also unclear
what a copyright holder would have to do if the material did not contain
a
8 2 A similar situation exists in the trademark context. 83
notice."
copyright

be nothing they could do about it because entries to the BBS were automatically deleted two
weeks alter posting. See id.
175. See id.
176. Id. In Netcom, the materials posted on the BBS contained copyright notices. Id. The
district court was unsympathetic to the defendant's claim of lack of knowledge. Id.But the district
court offered that in situations where there was a colorable claim of fair use, a lack of copyright

notices, or if the copyright holder failed to provide proof of likely infringement, a defendant's lack
of knowledge might be found reasonable. Id.
177. Religious Tech. Cir., 907 F. Supp. at 1375.

178. Id
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. See Religious Tech. Cr., 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
183. The Religious Technologies case is basically a dead letter with respect to ISPs after the
passage of the DMCA.
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D. ContributoryInfringement in Trademark
There is no statutory rule regarding contributory liability in trademark
law."8 Courts have, as in the copyright context, fashioned a rule based on
the common law. 85 However, unlike in the copyright context, contributory
infringement in trademark law is not limited by a statute like the DMCA.
1. Origins
In Inwood Laboratoriesv. Ives Laboratories8 ' the U.S. Supreme Court
held that:
if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to
infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one
whom it knows, or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially
responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.'87
The Inwood case involved the manufacturing of generic drugs. 8 ' Inwood
was producing a drug in generic form after the Ives patent on the drug had
run out."8 9 However, Inwood made its pills look exactly like those of Ives.'"
The U.S. Supreme Court found that this could be contributory infringement
if Inwood knew pharmacists would take advantage of the fact that the pills
looked alike and fill prescriptions for Ives' pills with the cheaper version
produced by Inwood. "'
Inwood involved a product and is therefore closely analogous to the
patent theory of contributory infringement.' 92 However, the Inwood
concurrence points out that the rule established by the majority expands the
knowledge requirement normally applied in the patent context. 93 There,
contributory infringement required actual knowledge that others would use

184. See Cross, supra note 149, at 109-10.
185. Id.
186. 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
187. Id.

188. See id. at 846-49.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See id.
See id.
See Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854-59.
Id.
See id. at 859-64 (White, J., concurring).
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the product for infringing purposes. 94 The Inwood formulation of the
knowledge requirement says that the contributory infringer must "know or
have reason to know."'" This effectively means something less than actual
knowledge can suffice.' 9
2. Expansion
Inwood was expanded to cover services as well as products by Hard
Rock Cafe v. Concession Services.'97 In that case, the plaintiff brought a

claim of contributory infringement against the operator of a flea market that

sold space to the defendant.'9 " The circuit court agreed that the flea market
operator was like a landlord.' 99 As such, they had a common law duty to
control persons they permitted on their premises. 2" The circuit court
distinguished this case as one not involving vicarious liability because the
defendant and the infringer did not "have an apparent or actual
partnership,
20
[or] have authority to bind one another in transactions .... ," 1
The case was remanded, however, on the issue of the flea market

operator's contributory liability because the lower court had not made
sufficient findings to satisfy Inwood's "know or have reason to know
requirement.1 22' The lower court had simply found that the flea market

operator was "willfully blind" to the possibility that infringing activity was
taking place.2 3 This finding appears to be based on the operator's failure to
take precautions against infringement, rather than any findings as to its state
194. Id. at 861. See also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980,
984 (9th Cir. 1999).
Hard Rock and Fonovisa teach us that when measuring and weighing a fact
pattern in the contributory infringement context without the convenient "product"
mold dealt with in Inwood, we consider the extent of control exercised by the
defendant over the third party's means of infringement. Direct control and

monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to infringe the plaintiff's
mark permits the expansion of Inwood's "supplies a product" requirement for
contributory infringement.

Id.
195.
196.
standard.
197.
198.

See Inwood,.456 U.S. at 854.
The DMCA allows for a finding of knowledge on something akin to the reason to know
955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992).
See id. at 1145.

199. See id. at 1148-49.
See id.at 1149 (citing

200.
201.
202.
203.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

Id.at 1150.
See HardRock,955 F.2d at 150.
Id.at 1149.

§ 877(c) (1979)).
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of mind.2 ' While the circuit court agrees willful blindness is akin to actual
knowledge, they offer that the lower court has not pointed to facts that
establish willful blindness." 5
The circuit court further offers that the flea market operator has no
affirmative duty to take precautions against the sale of infringing material.2 '
The circuit court claims the reason to know portion of the Inwood rule
simply means that the defendant is required "to understand what a
reasonably prudent person would understand, [and] it does not impose any
duty to seek out and prevent violations.'2
This falls short of the proper analysis. In Inwood, the U.S. Supreme
Court did not require Ives to prove that Inwood had actual knowledge of the
infringing behavior of the pharmacists. 0' ° Rather, it seems the "reason to
know" addition to the rule was there specifically to allow Ives to succeed
despite Inwood's lack ofactual knowledge.2'
It is disingenuous of the HardRock court to say this portion of the test
imposes no duty on the flea market operator.2"0 It was a necessary element
in Inwood. How can one say that a reasonably prudent person would know
the activity in front of them is infringing, but then say they have no duty to
investigate further? This implies that so long as the third party distances
themselves from the infringing behavior, and takes steps such that they will
not gain actual knowledge that infringement is taking place, they are free
from liability.2 ' This is exactly the kind of behavior the willful blindness
standard is intended to prevent. 2 This behavior is exactly why courts have
equated "willful blindness" with "actual knowledge."2" 3
The real issue created by the "reason to know" standard is the degree of
investigation required by the reasonably prudent person who reasonably
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1149.
208. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982).
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 305 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "willful blindness" as "[A]
term used to refer to a situation where the defendant tries to avoid knowing something that will
incriminate. It is usually held in this situation that the defendant 'knows' anyway because he is
aware of a high probability of existence.").
213. See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148
(7th Cir. 1992) (The Hard Rock court concluded that both defendants were "guilty of willful
blindness that counterfeit goods were being sold on [their] premises." Another sentence follows,
however, which somewhat dilutes the impact of the preceding finding: "Neither defendant took
reasonable steps to detect or prevent the sale of Hard Rock Cafe counterfeit T-shirts on its premise
(sic].") (citations omitted).
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believes infringing activity is taking place.1 4 When the lower court found
that the flea market operator in HardRock had not taken "reasonable steps
to detect or prevent" 251 the infringing behavior, the lower court was saying
they did nothing when surely they were obliged to do something.2 6 The
lower court is saying the "reason to know" standard simply imposes on the
party with reason to believe infringing behavior is taking place, the
obligation
to undertake a reasonable investigation to confirm or deny that
17
belief.
In Fonovisa v. CherryAuction,218 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied both Inwood and HardRock in another case involving a flea market
operator. 219 There is no mention in the Fonovisa decision of HardRock's
distinction regarding the "reason to know" standard.220 Clearly, this is
factually the same case as Hard Rock.22 ' Yet this court recognized that the
Inwood standard does in fact impose some duty on third parties to
investigate trademark infringement, saying that "a swap meet can not
disregard its vendors' blatant trademark infringements with impugnity
[sic]. 2 22 After Fonovisa there is a viable cause of action for contributory
infringement against a service provider. This could be extended to an ISP.
3. Application to the Internet
Very few cases are applying these decisions to the Intermet context. In
Lockheed Martinv. Network Solutions,223 the district court found there was
no viable claim for contributory infringement in a case involving an
allegedly infringing domain name. 24 This decision is case specific for two
reasons. First, the defendant Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) only registered
the trademarked domain name." They did not directly profit from the use
of those trademarks, unlike the defendant flea market operators in Hard
214. Seeid.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996).
219. See id.
220. Id
221. Compare Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1145 with Fonovisa 76 F.3d at 261.
222. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 265.
223. 985 F. Supp. 949, 967 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
224. See id
225. Id. at 957. The district court points out that domain names have two functions. Id. at
958. The first is a technical one and the second commercial. See id. NSI is involved with the
technical function - that is allowing computers to talk to each other. See id. The holder of the
domain name is responsible for the commercial function - that is using the domain name to sell
goods or services. See id.
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Rock and Fonovisa.226 Second, NSI is a unique defendant because they have
a government contract for the registration of domain names.227 The case
might be different if it involved an ISP that allowed a web user to make use
of an infringing domain name in commerce.22 The ISP, unlike NSI, shares
in the profit made through the use of the infringing domain name just as the
flea market organizer in HardRock profited from the sale of T-shirts.229
In a footnote in Lockheed Martin, the district court hypothesizes that
contributory liability as applied in Hard Rock and Fonovisa would be
unlikely to apply to an ISP.23° The district court theorizes that those cases do
not apply to Network Solutions because Zeran v. America Online, 3 ' had
noted that Congress had created tort immunity for ISPs in 47 U.S.C. §
230(c). 32
In Gucci v. Hall,2" however, the district court found this argument
unavailing, pointing out that in 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2), Congress also said
that any limitation of liability was not to be implied where such limitation
would "limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property." ' 4 In
fact, the district court Cites the legislative history of section 230 that
indicates that its purpose was only to immunize ISPs against "defamation
and other non-intellectual property, state law claims arising from third party
content."23
The Gucci case involved an allegation of contributory infringement
against an ISP because of the infringing activity taking place on a web site
that the ISP hosted. 36 This case is a recent development and has not been
followed by other courts. However, it opens the door to contributory
trademark infringement liability for ISPs. The remaining question then is
whether this is good public policy.
226. See HardRock, 955 F.2d at 1146 (discussing financial benefit flea market operators
received from allowing infringing activity to continue); Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263 (discussing
financial benefit).
227. See Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 953. It would seem inapposite for a court to hold NSI
liable for the very activity that is the subject of its government contract. Id. at 951. Given the
exclusive nature of the contract one might argue that NSI is an agent of the government with

official immunity. Id. at 961.
228. Id. at 960.
229. Id.at 962.
230. Id. at 962 n.7.
231. 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1997).
232. Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 962 n.7 (citing Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 33031 (4th Cir. 1997)).
233. 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

234. Id.
235. Id. at 417 (citations omitted).
236. Id. at 410-1 !.The defendant web site had used the Gucci trademark on the face of its
web pages. Id.
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IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The rationale for creating trademark protection can be found in the
balancing of a number of competing interests. On the one hand, legislators
are reticent to grant monopoly powers to a business and, on the other hand,
they want to make it easier for consumers to find products in a store.237 The
balance struck. by trademark law is to grant a sliding scale of monopoly
protection depending on the degree to which the mark can be identified with
a particular product manufacturer and therefore serve the. interest of
lowering consumer search costs. Allowing trademark holders to bring suits
for infringement gives them the ability to protect their trademark. This
consequently serves consumer interests in that if there are fewer
unauthorized uses of trademarks, there is less chance that consumers will be
duped into buying inferior or different products than they intend.
The question is whether allowing trademark holders to sue third parties
on a contributory liability theory serves the interest of lowering consumer
search costs. On the one hand, such a rule is sensible because ultimately it
is the actions of the third party that may most seriously damage the value of
trademarks to consumers. An individual brick-and-mortar store may infringe
a trademark, but the scope of that infringement is limited by the physical
realities of the world. The same act on the Internet has a much wider scope
and therefore more potential to damage the value of the trademark being
infringed. However, in order to infringe a trademark on the Internet one
must gain access to the network.' Thus, the need for a web host such as an
ISP.
Allowing third party suits could allow trademark holders to put a stop to
the large volume of infringing activity possible on the Internet by cutting it
off at a single convenient point. Without such a rule, trademark holders
might simply have to allow some infringing activity to take place if the costs
of investigation and litigation are more than the benefit of curtailing the
infringing activity. Contributory infringement suits would also allow
trademark holders to get at a number of small scale infringers in a costeffective manner.
While third party suits create a cost advantage for trademark holders,
there is a concomitant cost disadvantage for ISPs. In a world where direct
infringement is the only cause of action, trademark holders must go to the
expense of not only suing infringers, but also the expense of finding them.
When contributory liability is a cause of action, a disincentive for trademark
holders to conduct searches for infringers and at the same time ISPs are
237. See Posner, supra note 54, at 447-48.
238. Certainly, some companies may have their own servers and thus no need for an ISP.
However, many smaller businesses cannot afford to purchase servers or may simply find it more
cost effective to rent server space from an ISP.
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encouraged, if not forced, to take over that searching activity to avoid

potential litigation. In determining how best to balance these costs, it is
instructive to see how Congress dealt with contributory liability in the area
of copyright law.
A. DMCA Safe HarborProvisions
The Senate judiciary committee report on the DMCA pointed out that
a number of cases had found ISPs liable for contributory copyright
infringement. 39 Rather than rewriting the law, the committee chose to create
"safe harbor" provisions for certain common ISP activities. 4 ' The DMCA
contained a limitation on liability for contributory infringement in the realm
" ' The statute reads:
of copyrights.24
A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief ... for
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of
a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or
operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider: (A) (i)
does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using
the material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously
to remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity, in a case in which-the service provider has the
right and ability to control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in
paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to,
the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of
infringing activity. 4 '
In practical terms, an ISP is unlikely to have "reason to know" given the
volume of material they deal with. However, the statute allows that an ISP
can be made aware of alleged infringing activity through notification.243
Once notified the ISP would certainly have reason to know of infringing
behavior. In that instance the statute requires them to take steps to remove
the material. 44
239. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998).

240. See id.; 17 U.S.C. § 512(cXI) (West Supp. VI 2000).
241. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (West Supp. V! 2000).
242. Id. § 512(cX!).
243. See id § 512(cX3).
244. See id. §§ 512(c)()(A)(iii), 512(c)(1)(C).
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The notification provisions in the statute require the holder of the
copyright to identify the copyrighted work, 45 identify the material alleged
to be infringing and where to find it.2 4' The copyright holder must also assert
that they have a good faith belief that the use of the material is infringing.247
Finally, the entire notification must state that it is true and accurate under
penalty of pejury.4
Nothing in the statute requires the ISP to make any judgements regarding
whether the allegedly infringing material is a fair use. 49 If the holder of the
copyright is willing to assert a good faith claim of infringement, then the ISP
is required to take steps to remove the material. This operates as a sort of
preliminary injunction in that the alleged infringer will now have a chance
to asserts their rights in court. The ISP can avoid liability completely and as
a practical matter has no affirmative duty to search for potentially infringing
material on its system.25 °
The statute makes good sense for two reasons. First, it puts search costs
on the holder of the right. The holder of a copyright is obligated to incur the
expense of enforcing his rights. The ISP has no affirmative obligation to
seek out potential instances of infringement.25 ' Rather, they have only the
obligation
to take steps to eliminate infringement once they become aware
252
of it.
Second, the obligation for determining whether the alleged infringement
is in fact infringement is placed on the holder of the right.253 They are the
ones who must attest, under penalty of perjury, that the alleged copyright
infringement is in fact infringement.254 This obligates the holder to weigh
245.
246.
247.
248.'

See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii).
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(AXiii) (West Supp. V1 2000).
See id. § 512(cX3)(AXv).
See id. § 512(c)(3XA)(vi).

249. Fair use is not a cognizable defense in patent law. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 273 (1994).

However, patents are much more circumscribed than copyrights. Unlike patent law, in copyright
law the holder has a right not only to the copyrighted material but any derivative works. See 17
U.S.C. § 106 (1994). The substantial non-infringing use clause in the patent statute, see 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(c) (1994), requires a potential defendant to make some legal determination regarding a

product. Id. However, the DMCA does not require such legal determinations on the part of third
parties. Md
250. This assumes that the "aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity
is apparent" language will generally not be contested absent notification. Given the volume of

material the system of an ISP encompasses, it would be difficult to prove the ISP was "aware" of
infringing activity without some kind of notice. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1994).
251. See Christian C.M. Beams, The CopyrightDilemma Involving OnlineServiceProviders:
Problem Solved ... for Now, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 823, 834 (1999) ("(W]hile there was no

affirmative duty to constantly police one's customers, an ISP, under the provisions of this bill,
could not ignore suspicious activity when it became aware of such activity.").
252. See id.
253. See id

254. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(AXvi) (West Supp. VI 2000).
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the possibility of a fair use defense or to determine if in fact the alleged
infringer is a licensee. 2"

Under this statute, Congress was willing to allow some non-infringing
material to be excised from the Web on the basis of a good faith belief that
it is infringing.2 " This leaves final determinations of fair use to the courts
where they belong. These provisions impose the same threshold knowledge
requirement in the copyright context that Inwood does in the trademark
context.2

The House report explains the knowledge requirement, saying it "is met
either by actual knowledge of infringement or, in the absence of such
knowledge, by awareness of facts or circumstances form which infringing
activity is apparent."258 The 'awareness of facts or circumstances' language
is described as a "red flag."25 9 The report says "a service provider need not
monitor its service or affirmatively seek facts indicating infringing
activity.... However, if the service provider becomes aware of a "red flag"
from which infringing26activity is apparent, it will lose the liability limitation
if it takes no action. 0
The House describes the determination of awareness on the part of the
ISP as both a subjective and an objective test.26' That is, a court is to
determine first whether the ISP was subjectively aware of the infringing
behavior, and then objectively whether those facts would26 2lead a reasonable
person to believe infringement was in fact taking place.
This is clearly the same standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Inwood 263 The difference is a formalized notice procedure. With respect
to the DMCA however, if a riotice to an ISP does not meet the statutory
requirements, no action on the part of the ISP is necessary. 64 Under the
255. See id
256. See id
257. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(AXii) (West Supp. VI 2000) with Inwood Labs., Inc.
v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
258. H.R. REP. No. 105-55 1, at 53 (1998).
259. See id.
260. Id
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
264. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3XBXi) (2001). The statutory notice requirements are:
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the
owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (ii) Identification of the
copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted
works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative
list of such works at that site. (iii) Identification of the material that is claimed
to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be
removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably
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any notice might
Inwood rule since there are no formal notice procedures,
265
be enough to obligate the ISP to take some action.
B. Distinguishing Trademark and Copyright
Although trademark and copyright are both forms of intellectual
property, they are distinguishable both in whom they protect and the overall
public policy goals they seek to reach. Because of these differences, one
must consider whether it is appropriate to treat contributory infringement in
the copyright realm in the same way as one might in the trademark context.
Copyright law exists primarily to promote the wide dissemination of
information.266 Copyright law covers a wide variety of works so long as they
can be "fixed in a tangible medium of expression. ', 61 It creates legal
protection for such works on the theory that if creators have some legal
protection for their work they will be more likely to allow public access to
it.168 This serves to increase the level of knowledge and information

available to everyone. 6 9
Under one theoretical underpinning of copyright law, copyrights
primarily benefit the holder of the right while creating an ancillary benefit
to the public? 0 Conversely, trademarks primarily benefit consumers while
sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material. (iv) Identification
reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining
party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail
address at which the complaining party may be contacted. (v) A statement that
the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the
manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the
law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and
under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf
of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
See id.§ 512(c)(3)(A).
265. See Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854. Arguably notice that would be insufficient under the
DMCA and could still give an ISP reason to know of infringing behavior taking place on a web
site it hosts. d
266. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 61, at 353.
267. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2001). Copyrightable material includes: (I) literary works; (2)
musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8)
architectural works. See id.
268. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 12
(5th ed. 1999).
269. See id. at 13-14.
270. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 61, at 351. The author cites the natural rights view of
copyright law that authors should be able to maintain control over their work and be rewarded for
it as a "significant underpinning of copyright law." See id.But the author also states that the
predominant philosophical framework of copyright law is utilitarian. See id. In other words, this
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creating an ancillary benefit to the trademark holder.27' A key distinction
between copyright and trademark law is that the copyright holder can
benefit from the law without serving the purposes for which the right was
created.272 Copyright law has no requirement that the copyright holder
actually disseminate the information or art subject to the copyright.27 3 A
copyright holder may effectively sit on his rights.7 4 Conversely, for the
trademark holder to maintain his rights he must continue to use the
trademark in commerce.2 75 Failure to use a trademark in commerce can
result in abandonment and loss of trademark rights.276 While a trademark can
potentially last forever, that long life comes at a price to the holder.
In considering whether copyright and trademark law should be treated
in the same fashion with respect to contributory infringement, it is important
to consider the ease with which infringement can be spotted. Copyright
rights are more broadly based than trademarks. The copyright holder not
only has rights in the actual words that make up a manuscript but also in
derivative works based on the original. 7 There is no analogous right in
trademark.
However, the fair use doctrine applies to both copyright and
trademark. 278 This means that even in cases of infringement that might
appear clear, there may not in fact be infringement. In trademark law there
is the additional complication that confusingly similar marks can be used
simultaneously if they are used in separate product markets
279 or even for the
locations.
geographic
different
in
used
if
same products
means that copyright law is designed primarily to enhance the public interest and only secondarily
to confer rewards on authors. See id. For more discussion of these competing theories, see id.at
2-18.
271. See id. at 559 ("Traditionally, there has been nothing in trademark law analogous to the
desire to encourage invention or creation that underlies (at least in part) patent and copyright

law.").
272. See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 268, at 39.

273. See id.
274. See id.

275. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2001).
276. See id.
Abandonment is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2001).
277. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) (discussing the rights of the copyright holder in derivative

works).
278. See id§ 107 (discussing the statutory requirements for copyright fair use); 15 U.S.C.
§ II 15(b)(4) (1994) (discussing the statutory requirements for trademark fair use).
279. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959)
(establishing the limited area defense or Dawn Donut Rule). In this case, the plaintiff was an
unregistered user of the "Dawn" trademark which it used in conjunction with its sales of donuts.
Id. The defendant sold donuts under the same trademark but in a different geographic area. Id.
Because the plaintiff's use of the "Dawn" trademark began before the defendant had registered
its trademark, the circuit court allowed the plaintiffto continue to use the trademark in the limited
area where it was established. Id. at 368. Imagine the consequences of such a rule in the Internet
world where geographic boundaries do not exist.
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There are a number of dissimilarities between copyright and trademark
law leading to the conclusion that they should not necessarily be treated in
the same way in terms of contributory infringement.
C. Rationalefor Allowing ContributoryInfringement in Trademark
The best reason to allow a cause of action for contributory infringement
in trademark law is that it will help to promote the goals of trademark law.
If through the mechanism of contributory infringement the law can help to
prevent consumer confusion and reduce consumer search costs, then it is a
good rule.
The greatest benefit to trademark holders is that they would be able to
prevent infringement on a large scale without incurring as many costs. The
World Wide Web is a vast marketplace. New web sites are added to that
marketplace everyday. For the individual trademark right holder to police
the entire Web for infringing behavior would be an enormous cost. Unlike
localized infringement that can occur in the brick-and-mortar world
infringement on the Web is potentially far more harmful to business.
It would certainly be much easier for those allowing access to the Web
to police for infringing behavior than for the individual trademark holders
to do so. Many large companies like Playboy Enterprises have the capability
and motivation to conduct such policing on their own. But the vast majority
of trademark holders do not have such resources. The result for them is that
a certain degree of infringing behavior has to be tolerated. While this rule
may result in some loss of the ISP's business, the larger concern is the
degradation of trademarks generally. 80 If wide spread infringement is
allowed to become commonplace, the value of trademarks to consumers is
reduced.
D. Arguments Against Allowing ContributoryInfringement in Trademark
The primary argument against allowing a cause of action for contributory
infringement of trademarks is that it imposes search costs on ISPs.2"'
Trademark rights, while serving some public good, are generally thought to
be personal rights of the holders. 282 As such, it is the responsibility of the
holder of the trademark to enforce it. 2 3 That means, the trademark holder

280. That is if ISPs are forced to eliminate web sites that potentially infringe trademarks to
avoid liability, the risk averse ISP will likely eliminate more web sites than they would if the right
holder were required to give notice. One may argue that the result of this overprotection is a
reduction in the profits ISPs realize from hosting web sites.
281. See Gasparek, supra note 8, at 799.
282. See id.
283. See id.
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must actively seek to protect the mark from infringement.2 Laches theory
has been applied in some instances when courts found that a trademark
holder sat on his rights too long before asserting an action for
infringement.8

Placing the obligation for discovering infringing behavior on the ISP
increases the strength of trademark rights. That is, we can assume the ISP
will conduct a cost benefit analysis of the cost of potential litigation versus
the cost of losing some business. If the cost of litigation is higher then the
risk, a neutral ISP should opt for forcing the web site it is hosting to remove
the potentially infringing trademarks.
In all likelihood, this means larger corporations with the resources to
bring costly lawsuits will be able to disproportionately influence the use of
their trademarks by others. Whereas the small company without the means
to bring a costly lawsuit will have to suffer not only infringement of their
marks2 but will potentially be prevented from making fair use of other
marks. Many potentially infringing uses may in fact be fair use.
A reduction in the fair use of trademarks means that the property right
created by the trademark is stronger. Fair use is part of the trade-off of
trademark law. While patent law creates an almost exclusive monopoly for
patent holders, "s' trademark law allows only for a limited monopoly.288 Fair
use is part of that limitation. A reduction in the level of fair use of
trademarks
means a corresponding increase in the strength of trademark
289
rights.
284. See id
285. See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss, 433 F.2d 686, 703 (2d Cir. 1970).

Where a person entitled to exclusive use of a trademark is guilty of unreasonable
delay in asserting his rights against an infringer or junior user, or acquiesces in
the latter's use, or evinces an intent to abandon his rights in the marks, a court
of equity has the discretionary power, after weighing the respective interests of
the parties, to deny injunctive relief or an accounting.
Id.
286. Certainly, in the current regime the company who is unable to bring any lawsuit is still
in the same position. But there is a qualitative difference between the sort of litigation General
Motors can threaten and the sort the local restaurant chain may be able to bring.
287. See-35 U.S.C. § 27 l(a) (1994) ("[Wlhoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell,
or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
288. See Posner, supra note 54, at 467 (explaining fair use and citing 15 U.S.C. § 11 !5(b)(4)

(1994)).
289. While this point appears to favor allowing contributory infringement suits against an
ISP; in reality, it only points out that allowing such suits result in strengthening the property right
that is a trademark. Thus raising the question of whether, as a policy matter, we should be
interested in a new cause of action whose result is not just getting infringers of the Internet but
may effectively do so by strengthening the basic trademark right in the first instance.
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Fair use in trademark law has an important benefit for consumers - it
allows for product comparisons, among other things.2 ' If product
comparison is curtailed, particularly between the smaller company and the
large corporation, consumers do not benefit. This not only creates a barrier
to market entry for smaller companies, but it creates a situation in which, at
least in e-commerce, larger companies need not work as hard to improve
their products for fear of losing market shares to newer companies.
Although search costs are increased for ISPs in this scenario, the increase
serves a public good. It is not simply that they are spending time and money
doing something that rights holders would otherwise do themselves. Rather,
it is also that they are performing a public service by helping to ensure the
ability of trademarks to continue to reduce search costs for consumers.291
V. CONCLUSION

This Article seeks to establish that, under current precedent in the
federal courts, there is a cause of action for contributory trademark
infringement against an ISP. This cause of action is limited to the infringing
use of a trademark on the face of a web page and in the metatags of a web
site. This Article has argued that application of contributory infringement
liability in the metatag context, where the theory of infringement is based
on initial interest confusion, stretches trademark doctrine too far. The
possibility of contributory liability on the basis of such a theory should
encourage courts to consider the validity of the initial interest theory in the
first instance.
This Article has sought to deal with whether contributory infringement
in the trademark context is good public policy. The use of trademarks on the
Web could be vast, and placing the burden for policing cyberspace on ISPs
demands too much. The notice requirements spelled out in the DMCA
should be applied by statute to trademarks as they have been in the
copyright context. 292 This would grant trademark holders the ability to
290. See 15 U.S.C. § II 15(b)(4)(1994); Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1185
(5th Cir. 1980) ("The 'fair-use' defense, in essence, forbids a trademark registrant to appropriate
a descriptive term for his exclusive use and so prevent others from accurately describing a
characteristic of their goods.").
291. It is not unprecedented to require certain public utilities to perform public services in
exchange for a license to operate. For example in the television and radio industry, broadcast
licenses require the holder of the exclusive right to broadcast on a given frequency to air a
specified amount of public service programming. This is partial payment for the monopoly right
they are granted by the license. While ISPs do require similar licenses to operate, they can
arguably be classified as a public utility and be required to conduct business in accord with certain
federal requirements.
292. Note that the Fonovisa decision in 1994 predates the Religious Technologies decision
in 1995. The latter case was cited in the DMCA Senate report, and presumably was in part
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enforce their marks use on the Web in instances where direct action against
the infringer is either too costly or inefficient.
The state of trademark lawhas yet to reach the extent that copyright law
had prior to the passage of the DMCA. However, the Gucci decision has
opened the door to the same types of suits in trademark law that Religious
Technologies did in the copyright realm. Contributory trademark
infringement suits have the same destructive potential for ISPs as they did
in the copyright realm. Congress should seize the opportunity to limit

contributory infringement for trademarks on the Internet.

responsible for the impetus to create the DMCA's safe harbor provisions. Query why Congress
did not seize that opportunity to apply the same rules to trademark infringement on the Internet.

